Our Afghan Policy - Redux

In my last post on our Afghan policy, I stated I was confused. Let me state for the record: I’m no longer confused. I’m just angry. Every one accepts the principle that, until there is an effective government in place in Kabul, nothing else is going to work. There is no effective government in Kabul; there is only the weak, ineffective and corrupt Karzai government. And its power barely extends to the Kabul city limits. To top it all off, this government is the result of an admitted fraudulent election.

General McChrystal says the Taliban are winning and, unless he receives anywhere from 20,000-40,000 additional troops, the game is over. We will have lost Afghanistan. Now, the good general, along with his boss, General Petraeus, are students of asymmetric warfare. Asymmetric—a fancy name for fighting against an insurgency. But didn’t General McChrystal say, just the other day, that until and unless some entity cleans up the current Afghan regime, and converts this corrupt cabal into an effective government, there’s very little military forces can hope to accomplish in ther struggle against insurgent elements.

I recall, when preparing for Vietnam duty back in 1968, the rubric was, “The power of the emperor stops at the village gates.” The central government of the then South Vietnam exercised only minimal control over the regions of the country. And this is what we now see in Afghanistan. The Pentagon has nominated a new general officer to oversee all training activities. But how do you train a police force that is composed of young men who have bribed their way into the force? These men will continue to have their salaries raided by the recipients of graft. And, once they become fully fledged police officers, they will begin making up for those payments of graft by demanding “fee for service” from the citizenry. The same principle exists within the justice system. Lesser judges have paid graft to senior judges to become seated magistrates and judges. They, in turn, like the police officers, will have to collect from those who seek justice in their courts. Thus we have “justice” awarded to the plaintiff or defendant depending on who pays whom and how much.

And the White House is dithering over how many more troops they should send to Afghanistan. Go ahead and send another 20,000. Send another 30,000—no, make that 40,000. It will make no difference. We will kill a mess of Taliban and we shall certainly experience more American and allied casualties and coffins. Unfortunately, nothing in Afghanistan will change. In the end, the Taliban will remain the only organized national element prepared to step up and govern the country.